Bestimmung, Hegel and Horizont

In order to make determinations about the world, determinations which can be either true or false, one must make certain presuppositions. Some kind of enabling feature is required, a horizon, in virtue of which the space of reasons appears as that about which one can make determinations.

To reveal a particular discourse’s presuppositions, let’s say one’s own discourse, in order to determine whether or not these presuppositions are true or false generates thereby a new discourse grounded on its own presuppositions. The attempt to transcend the finitude of one’s discourse leads, paradoxically, to an infinite regress. The infinite regress proves one’s finitude. This insight seeks to articulate the constitutive instability upon which our stable claims about the world rest. Once we seek to stabilize unstable presuppositions we generate new instabilities which thus occasion another round of stabilization and so on ad infinitum.

To organize or determine a situation as such and so requires the introduction of limitation into a situation qua situation. That is, a condition for the possibility of a situation is limitation insofar as in order for a situation to count as a situation it must be finite. Human subjectivity must impose a limitation upon an otherwise presumably infinitude of multiplicities if it is to have anything at all like what we call experience. However, human subjects can’t be held responsible for infinite (the Absolute, Unconditioned, etc) , organizational limitations given that subjects find themselves always already thrown into a “mythology” in virtue of which the objects of determination can, in fact, be objects of determination.

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